

Building bridges with the EU neighbours

BALTINFO INTERVIEW WITH THE CHAIR OF THE CBSS, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND,
H.E. MR. ADAM DANIEL ROTFELD

Congratulations on your appointment as Foreign Minister! You assumed your present position at precisely the mid-point of the Polish CBSS Presidency. Compared to the programme enunciated by Prime Minister Belka at the 2004 Laulasmaa Summit of the Baltic Sea States, what has been achieved so far and what is yet to accomplish?

Thank you for the congratulations! We are implementing the adopted priorities. A high level conference on civil security in the Baltic Sea region was held in Gdansk in September 2004, with the participation of guests from Belarus and Ukraine. The IV meeting of the CBSS Ombudsmen was held in Warsaw, and the Ars Baltica Forum was held in Gdansk. We are closely cooperating with the European Commission and the Nordic Council of Ministers. We are trying to set the activities of the working groups on new tracks. Some of them, especially the Task Force on Organised Crime, are working excellently. We are trying to ensure good co-ordination between the activities of various structures. However, we are still facing many tasks: finalising the new CBSS Terms of Reference, new impulses to Baltic Agenda 21 by the conference of the ministers of agriculture and environment, and closer co-operation in the field of science.

The 13th Ministerial session of the CBSS will be held little more than one year after the last EU enlargement. Different points of view have been expressed regarding the continued relevance of the CBSS in the post-enlargement period. What is your view on this?



H.E. Mr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, CBSS Chair.

The 13th Ministerial Session (9–10 June 2005) will be a good occasion to assess the results of EU enlargement and its impact on regional cooperation. The role of CBSS in the new situation remains large. Perhaps it may even increase, should it undertake new challenges and adapt its structures. With pleasure I note that also the European Commission attaches importance to CBSS in various fields, like the Northern Dimension, regional and cross-border cooperation, or building the civic society.

The European Neighbourhood Policy has not been unconditionally welcomed by all of the EU's so-called "new neighbours". Russia continues to demand and receive special treatment from the EU. The Ukraine after its "orange revo-

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lution” seems determined to get a clear perspective for eventual EU membership. Belarus continues to be diplomatically isolated. Can and should the CBSS have any role as an intermediary or bridge-builder?

I hope that the EU–Russia summit this May will bear fruits, which indirectly will also have a positive impact on active and constructive participation of Russia in the work of CBSS. Poland, like other CBSS Member States, supports Ukraine in her rapprochement with Euroatlantic structures, with a perspective of EU and NATO membership. We are also in favour of developing relations with our other eastern neighbour – Belarus, which would strengthen democratic forces and bring the country closer to European standards.

Poland is chairing several key structures of the CBSS, in addition to those falling under the foreign ministers, i.a.: the Baltic 21 Senior Officials Group, the Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation, the Working Group on Transport, the Working Group on Youth Affairs. Poland is also the lead-country for CBSS cooperation on civil security cooperation. Are you satisfied with the level and intensity of activity in all of these areas? Do you see a need for improvement in the national coordination of these efforts?

Cooperation between the MFA and field ministries dealing *inter alia* with Baltic Agenda 21, economy, energy, transport, youth and civil protection, is in place. We have held several meetings and maintain working contacts. However, I would like to stress, the results of the work of some structures could be better. But they depend not only on the chairperson, but also on all members. This concerns especially the structures dealing with economic cooperation, energy and transport. These groups are seeking a new formula of cooperation and precise tasks.

As Chair of the CBSS, the task of coordination of intergovernmental regional cooperation among the group of CBSS member states falls within your man-

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date – do you think the present structure and organisation of the CBSS is sufficiently developed to permit satisfactory realisation of this mandate? If not, what can and should be done to improve the situation?

The present structure of CBSS is adequate to ensure proper co-ordination. I would like to express here my high esteem of the CBSS Secretariat, which effectively supports the Presidency in this respect. Of special significance are the yearly meetings of the Co-ordination Committee, which gather the leaders of the most important actors engaged in the Baltic Sea cooperation.

It is a commonplace to remark that Poland’s geopolitical situation places you at the crossroads of Europe. From your perspective, does the CBSS and more broadly, the Northern Dimension of the EU a central position in the mindsets of policy- and decision-makers in Warsaw? Or are these peripheral concerns of marginal importance for Poland as an aspiring major player on the European scene? What can and should be done to make the Baltic Sea region in general and the CBSS in particular more attractive to Poland?

Since many years Poland is actively promoting regional cooperation. Poland is a member of CBSS, Central European Initiative, Visegrad Group, Regional Partnership, as well as an observer in Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council. Geographical location, historical reasons and current political and economic situation determine this interest. There is no conflict

in membership in the mentioned structures. As an example, I may mention the meeting of the four regional organisations, held recently in Warsaw on January 14.

Cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is of particular importance to Poland. I would like to recall that the Union of the Baltic Cities was established on the initiative of Gdansk. Already in 1990 in Ronneby, before the CBSS was established, on the initiative of Poland and Sweden, a meeting was held of the Heads of Government of the Baltic Sea states. We believe that after EU enlargement CBSS members, which are also EU members, share a joint interest to ensure a harmonious and successful development of the Baltic Sea region in the integrating Europe. I would also like to stress the strong engagement of our northern voievodships and main cities, like Gdansk, Szczecin and Olsztyn, in regional cooperation.

In conclusion, is there anything else you would like to say to the readership of Baltinfo?

I would like to assure the readers of Baltinfo that Poland, as CBSS Presidency, will spare no efforts to ensure fruitful cooperation within the framework of CBSS and its structures. Poland also counts on the support and assistance of all CBSS members, as well as of all structures operating in the region. The workload is very heavy and each initiative aimed at its implementation is welcome. The goal is a common one – to render our region more secure, to develop it more successfully, to make it more conspicuous on the map of Europe and World, to ensure respect of democratic values and human rights.

Challenges for the regional transport and infrastructure development

THE THEMATIC WORKSHOP was organised by the INTERREG III B Joint Secretariat and the VASAB 2010 Secretariat with the view to encouraging participants to come up with more project proposals/applications¹. The underlying reason is that over €14 million from the European Regional Development Fund is still left for new initiatives within the three application rounds remaining in 2005–06.

Baltinfo: During discussions at the Workshop, it was mentioned that the rapid growth of transportation flows in the region is outpacing the development of infrastructure and spatial planning. The increase in cargo traffic in the region expected in the future suggests a need for significant improvements in infrastructure, as well as in bridging missing transport links. **In your view, what are the key segments in our region that should be given priority in terms of infrastruc-**

“In the last decade alone the freight volumes handled in the area have more than doubled and the trend is even expected to accelerate on account of the EU enlargement.”

ture, transport connections and ICT development?

Dr Wiktor Szydarowski: It is indeed true that the Baltic Sea Region is forecast to have a distinct growth potential for land- and seaborne cargo flows. In the last decade alone the freight volumes handled in the area have more than doubled and the trend is even expected to accelerate on account of the EU enlargement. The dynamics of this process is outpacing the provision of adequate infrastructure. As financial resources for new transport projects are scarce, the climate is favourable for planning the optimum allocation of investments in the pipeline.

Geographical distribution of the new infrastructure is, however, the outcome of parallel and uncoordinated planning by various different bodies. For example, the European Commission cooperates closely with the member states in designing and establishing the Trans-European Transport Networks. This means that major investments acknowledged in the European transport plans are made by respective state governments who, in turn, continue to work on other national level projects designed to remove bottlenecks preventing the smooth flow of goods and passengers within the territory administered. The latest observation regarding ESPON (European Spatial Observatory Network) projects points out, however, that the European and national transport policies tend to favour metropolitan areas and large urban centres where congestion problems are the most severe. This could result in the progressive decline of more



Dr Wiktor Szydarowski.

peripheral areas, whose accessibility would consequently gradually worsen.

One remedy for this situation might lie in a new formula for the process of planning new transport infrastructure investments whose impact would then be assessed in the context of regional growth. This solution would also help to meet the criticism that transport policy measures are being neglected instead of being integrated with other measures aimed at improving regional economic development. In addition, a more effective dialogue with the private sector is needed.

Baltinfo: At the Workshop you introduced a project proposal entitled “Intermodality and Interoperability in the

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¹ The following themes in Measure 2.2 (“Creating sustainable communication links for improved spatial integration”) were identified as being missing: spatial planning issues in the field of maritime safety, “Motorways of the Baltic Sea”, improved access to ICT, pan-Baltic transport multi-modal strategy, hub-bound air traffic in the BSR, ensuring a continuation of transport links to the East, in the first instance to Russia (in the context of the Northern Dimension).

² Dr. Wiktor Szydarowski – Programme Development Manager, BSR INTERREG III B Joint Secretariat.



Mr Per Strømhaug.

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Baltic Sea region”. In particular it aimed at improving transport interconnections and bridging missing links not only across the East-West routes, but also in the North-South dimension. **Could you tell us more about the concept?**

Mr Per Strømhaug³: The Baltic Sea Commission has become increasingly aware of the need for a cohesive transport policy for the Baltic Sea region. The region has a huge potential for economic development in the “new” Europe, and transport and communications are most important in this connection.

In brief, the main objective of the proposed project is, as implied in the title, to develop better intermodal transport systems for cargo, and to establish better interconnections between public transport services across national borders.

We therefore aim to establish an “umbrella” covering the whole region for the purpose, in the first place, of bringing together the findings and experience accumulated during earlier initiatives and projects. The next step will be to identify any missing links in the transport infrastructure, or any new services that may be needed.

Four project work packages are proposed:

- Motorways of the Baltic Sea
- North – South intermodal transport axis
- Intercontinental transports through the Baltic Sea area
- Interoperability across national borders

Baltinfo: To what extent does this involve Russia?

Mr Per Strømhaug: Russia is experiencing economic growth and increased trade both with Baltic Sea countries and with the rest of the world. This will in turn generate large transport volumes to/from and through the Baltic Sea area. This will thus pose a significant challenge from the point of view of ensuring efficient traffic flows in the area, and because of the environmental, security and safety considerations. It is important that Russian interests are taken into account in the project, and Russia itself participates. North-west Russia, in particular the Kaliningrad Region, are also within the area eligible for INTERREG financing, and we hope to find partners from this area.

Baltinfo: Which regional organisation do you think should play a leading role in the promotion and implementation of this project?

Mr Per Strømhaug: Experience gained from the work of the Baltic Sea Commission (BSC) suggests that the regions could play an important role in identifying the requirements for industry and people in their respective regions. They could also, through organisations like CPMR, make their voices heard by the EU Commission and in other national and international forums. In order to make a real impact with the proposed project, it is crucial that we find a way to ensure cooperation on a

common platform at national and regional level. We also envisage cooperation between BSC and CBSS, representing the regions and the national level respectively. The BSSSC is also an important player to have in the team, and we could also mention others.

Baltinfo: During the Workshop it was suggested that the “soft” infrastructure – mainly ICT – should be treated equally important as the “hard” infrastructure. **Do you think there is a need to develop a separate branch of IT cooperation, “e-transport” perhaps, or “e-logistics”?**

Dr Wiktor Szydarowski: Experience of the transnational cooperation in spatial planning in the Baltic Sea Region offers a good opportunity to at least consider producing a strategic document on the subject of the use of ICT in transport and logistics. Facilitating easier access to ICT will be addressed as part of the logistic centres network activities, or under the concept of Baltic Sea Information Motorways. Both these illustrate the substantial usefulness of ICT in the context of transport and regional development.

Baltinfo: When it comes to discussing transport/infrastructure/logistic problems, apart from identifying bottlenecks, one has to consider investment options. **Apart from EU money, which other viable financial sources could, in your opinion, be sought in order to increase co-financing?**

Mr Per Strømhaug: That is a very comprehensive question. At present, we have a wide variety of regional, national and international financial instruments that may be used for different purposes. However, any initiative to facilitate co-financing, as well as to streamline the use of money in a more efficient way, should be welcomed. At this moment I have no better answer.

The presentations made at the meeting are available on the INTERREG III B website: <http://www.spatial.baltic.net/news.html>

³ Per Strømhaug, Chairman of the Transport Working Group, Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions, Baltic Sea Commission.

Innovation and competitiveness

IT GIVES ME A GREAT PLEASURE to address the Conference of the Baltic Metropolises in Berlin. The Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Baltic Metropolises have much in common – starting from the fact that they both were established in Copenhagen, the CBSS in 1992 and the Baltic Metropolises ten years later in 2002.

The Baltic Sea Region has undergone a paradigm shift during the last fifteen years, with emphasis moving from political to economic, social and environmental development. As a follow-up to the Baltic Sea Summit in June 2004 the CBSS is re-assessing its role within the regional playground after the EU enlargement. The search for a new niche that the CBSS could occupy in regional affairs would require a certain reprioritization, taking into account three parallel processes: EU enlargement, Russia's accession to the WTO and EU-Russia cooperation in the context of "Four Common Spaces". First outlines of the re-evaluation work would be considered at the next CBSS Ministerial meeting in Szczecin, in June 2005. Recently the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials held the meeting with high officials of the European Commission which en-



Ambassador Jozef Wiejacz.

couraged us to continue and even enrich our activities.

Such topics as regional and transborder cooperation, reducing barriers to trade and investment, promotion of entrepreneurship, improvement of conditions for border-crossing of goods, fight against corruption and enhanced cooperation with Russian North-West regions are high on the agenda for the current Polish Presidency of the CBSS. A particular interest, I should like to mention, lies in identifying ways and means of highlighting the perception of the Baltic Sea Region as an attractive area for investments. In our effort we are not forgetting our eastern neighbours Ukraine and Belarus.

Referring to a specific focus of this con-

ference, innovation, I would stress that one of the key conditions for strengthening competitiveness is a close link between the economic actors and education/research institutions. Innovation and advanced technical solutions, particularly in the field of small and medium size enterprises, could be crucial for both market expansion and attracting new investments. A knowledge-based economy is a goal that needs to be consistently pursued to this end. I hope that the conference of the Academies of Sciences and Research Institutes which will be organized in Poland in June 2005 will serve well this purpose.

On governmental level, the CBSS with a Working Group on Economic Cooperation, ad-hoc Working Group on Transport, Senior Officials on an Information Society, Baltic 21 on sustainable development and BASREC cooperation in energy sector are, respectively, making substantive contributions. Furthermore, the CBSS is actively participating in the Baltic Development Forum, particularly in the context of Baltic Sea Initiative 2010. But to make a lasting impact close cooperation and coordination with all regional actors, including the Baltic Metropolises, is indispensable.

New Staff in the CBSS Secretariat

On 7 February 2005 **Olga Kustova** and **Aleksey Kustov** started their traineeship with the Energy Unit of the CBSS Secretariat. They are both from Kaliningrad, Russia, where Olga is working for the company Gas-Oil JSC, a subsidiary of GAZPROM, while Aleksey is representing a subsidiary of RAO ES, Jantarenergo. Last year they participated in the Nordic Council of Ministers' scholarship programme for energy experts and the training period in the Energy Unit is a follow-on to these programme activities. They will be assisting the head of the Energy Unit until 1 April 2005.

Annika Thiele from Niebüll, Germany, is taking part in the internship programme of the CBSS Secretariat from 31 January to 31 March 2005. She has recently obtained a Master's

degree in "Environment and Sustainable Development" and will continue her studies in Political Science from April onwards. At the CBSS she is working in the Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation (BASREC) unit and is preparing a comparative analysis of economic instruments for climate change mitigation to be used by the CBSS Member States.

On 1 March 2005 **Katharina Götze** from Germany started her two-month internship at the CBSS Secretariat. She holds a BA in Political Science and English and is currently studying for a Master's degree in 'Culture, Communication and Globalization' in Aalborg (Denmark). Katharina's main task will be to assist the information officer with the implementation of the Council's Information and Communication Strategy.

OPINION

Baltinfo continues the series of opinion editorials on topics relevant to Baltic Sea Cooperation. The opinions expressed here are not to be interpreted as representing the opinions of the CBSS. This month's editorial is written by Christopher Browning who has worked on issues of regional cooperation and security in northern Europe for several years. He is also editor of the forthcoming publication: *'Remaking Europe in the Margins: Northern Europe after the Enlargements'* (Ashgate, 2005).

Rethinking Marginality: The Northern Experience as a Resource

BY DR. CHRISTOPHER BROWNING

IN RECENT YEARS questions about the future of regional cooperation in northern Europe have been high on the political agenda. The catalyst has been the dual enlargement of the EU and NATO within the region. The question on people's minds has been whether enlargement fundamentally changes matters in the region, and in particular whether with enlargement motivation for regional cooperation is likely to wane.

During the 1990s regional cooperation was driven by a combined agenda of 'idealism' and 'stabilisation'. Idealism was evident in that the collapse of the Berlin Wall promoted a sense of optimism and adventure. The chance to build links across previous divides and to recreate a new sense of regional community inclusive of all was best captured in metaphors like that of the north as the New Hansa.

Concomitantly, there were a variety of security concerns evident in the desire to prevent the region turning into a northern Balkans. Policies building on ideas of common and comprehensive security became central to goals of stabilising the region. In particular, a liberal institutionalist agenda that promoted security through cooperation in non-security or soft security realms became the order of the day.

With enlargement it seems the region may be entering a new period of 'normalisation' in which security concerns are no longer an overwhelming justification for cooperation, whilst the previous elements of idealism and self-sacrifice are



Dr. Christopher Browning.

increasingly being replaced by a focus on pragmatism and the expectation that cooperation should have a material dividend. Whilst this may seem disheartening it is also the result of success.

However, such success has raised concerns that regional cooperation may be in trouble, not least because now that they are members there is a question of whether the Baltic States will prioritise direct relations with the EU and NATO over a more regional approach. Indeed, this idea of the need to integrate as closely as possible with the core institutions of Europe has become an established part of political discourse in the region more generally, and threatens to undermine more regional agendas. In this context, there has been a growing tendency to equate the regional level with a lack of influence and as confining oneself to a position on the margins of Europe. Instead,

it is taken as self-evident that it is better to focus on the core where it is assumed the key decisions are made.

On the one hand, this either/or dichotomy between being in the margins or at the core is unhelpful as there is no reason why in different contexts states may locate themselves in different positions. However, the assumption that a position in the margins is a position of powerlessness is also problematic. Thus, it is necessary to point out how, since the end of the Cold War, the difference and marginality of northern Europe has at times actually presented significant opportunities, whilst it is also worth remembering that developments in the north have also had a much broader impact on the nature of European politics and the construction of European political space more generally.

The Northern Dimension (ND) initiative is an excellent example. The emergence of the ND can be seen precisely as an instance where a peripheral actor (Finland) capitalised on its marginality to orient the EU to its concerns. Whereas traditionally the north has been understood as entailing isolation, in this case the 'north' has been understood as a place from which to speak and act. Instead of running from the north, as might be expected given the peripherality usually associated with the concept, the 'north' has been utilised as a resource to position Finland in Europe and in the EU game, and at the same time to impact on the nature of the whole. Through the ND

“...the need to integrate as closely as possible with the core institutions of Europe has become an established part of political discourse in the region... and threatens to undermine more regional agendas.”

the north has been presented as a signifier and space for transcending East-West boundaries and for building a new relationship with Russia. Finland's power has derived from its location on the EU's edge and border with Russia and its determination not to let the EU and Russia unilaterally define that border.

Importantly, utilising the northern signifier has undermined centrist understandings of what Europe is about. A more decentralised Europe has been envisaged, where borders are not simply understood as lines of division, and where the north is no longer seen as the end of the road, but as a road going somewhere. From being an edge, the north has been depicted as a meeting place and a resource – not just a problem – not only for Finland, but also for the EU, Russia and other northern actors.

Also notable is that the difference and marginality of the region at times has been conceptualised as a resource by the major actors of the US, EU and Russia. Although certain traditional tensions still exist, towards the end of the 1990s there was a realisation that something quite unusual was developing in the north. At different times the US, EU and Russia have each spoken about the north as a laboratory, test case, or a place of innovation for experimenting with new forms of governance. American officials have

even presented the north as a place where it might at last be possible to transcend balance of power approaches to international politics in favour of a more 'post-modern' agenda.

The American approach has been to try and encourage the actions of local and regional groups through rather low-key policy frameworks, like the Northern European Initiative (NEI), now repackaged as the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (ePINE). Instead of forcefully asserting its preferences for world order on the region as the US has done elsewhere, it has been an interested observer trying to learn from the northern experience, with the goal being to see if northern lessons might be exported to other regions. The conclusions drawn have been positive, with the US now actively encouraging regional actors (especially the Baltic States) to help other countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in the transition process. The open question here is whether 'northern solutions' actually are applicable to other parts of Europe and the world, or if they are just a reflection of unique northern conditions.

Importantly, however, similar elements can also be found in EU and Russian approaches. For example, the EU has seen the ND as a possible model for its new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), whilst Russia has occasionally spoken about Kaliningrad as a test case for West-Russian cooperation, and is increasingly interested in the north as a test site for promoting the extension of the four freedoms and four common spaces to Russia. In each case what is interesting is that contrary to usual practice, the world's centres are seen to have something to learn from the margins.

In conclusion, and at a time when the future direction and intensity of regional cooperation in the north has been questioned, it is important to remember that constitutive power can be located in the margins and that to the extent that regional cooperation slips off the political agenda there is a danger of throwing out the baby with the bath water. Arguably, it

is precisely the 'northern experience' of intensive regional cooperation and subjectivity building that provides legitimacy and weight when northern actors speak out in regard to unfolding European and world events and such a resource should not be given up lightly. This speaks for refocusing regional efforts, and ensuring that policy frameworks like the ND are able to retain their uniqueness and flexibility, and do not succumb to homogenising pressures coming from the core that are also apparent in the context of the ENP (e.g., the limited space provided for outsiders to play a role in policy formulation, which is one of the most innovative aspects of the ND).

When thinking about the future of regional cooperation and the emphasis that regional actors wish to place on it, the point to remember is that the nature and character of regional cooperation in the north is not just a matter of cost-benefit calculations at the regional level, but will also – as the ND experience indicates – impact on the very nature of Europe in general. This is not just a question of how to maximise power and influence in Europe, but also about just what kind of Europe northern actors want to create. It is a question about how much space for openness and heterogeneity is preferred, and of the extent to which boundaries between insiders and outsiders are to be blurred. In this context, for example, it is arguably still in the north that the chances for building a new relationship with Russia and integrating it into a more open greater Europe best exist. This, however, requires eschewing the trend towards centralisation for a more regionalised and differentiated approach that recognises that sometimes it is precisely in the margins where the most progress can be made.

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Is the CBSS sufficiently well known to the public?

IT IS PROBABLY FAIR TO SAY that Baltic Sea Cooperation in general, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States in particular, is not very well known to the public. It has not been easy to attract the attention of journalists. Apparently, stable regional cooperation with decision-making based on consensus is not "sexy" for the media. Nevertheless, Baltic Sea Cooperation, as it is funded by tax payers' money and can present a number of success stories, deserves attention.

One might ask whether the CBSS should aim at addressing the general public at all, or whether it is better to focus the limited resources on smaller and more well defined target groups, or on those who are interested. Another question is whether increased visibility and awareness would enhance the impact of the CBSS in the region? The answer is, presumably, that it would.

New Information Strategy

The new Information and Communication Strategy for the CBSS, which was adopted by the CSO in February, addresses this dilemma. The strategy focuses on providing information to a number of target groups, of which the media is not the primary target group. Instead, the CBSS has decided to focus its limited resources on addressing the CBSS Structures and Working Bodies, the Observers, Special Participants and Strategic Partners.

We have calculated that several hundred individuals in the region participate directly in the work of the CBSS and its working bodies. These individuals are the best ambassadors the CBSS could have! If they are well informed, they could multiply the information efforts.

Another priority is libraries, documentation centers, research institutes and the academic sector. The general public and the press are mostly handled by the press



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centre of the CBSS Presidency with the assistance of the Secretariat. To improve coordination between these, the function of a press officer designated by the Presidency will be introduced this summer.

The two major information instruments are Baltinfo and the CBSS website. It is very important that the information available in these is perceived as relevant and useful by the above-mentioned target groups. For this reason, in my capacity as information officer, I would like to welcome any criticisms, comments or proposals from the readers of Baltinfo and the users of the CBSS website.

Welcome discussion

As attentive readers will have noticed, opinion editorials were introduced in the last issue of Baltinfo. The intention is to give a voice to persons with views relevant to Baltic Sea Cooperation but which do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of the CBSS. The Secretariat has already received a number of positive reactions to this initiative and we would like to call for opinion editorials from academics, students, NGOs and interested readers.

We hope that this strategy will in the long run ensure that more people become familiar with Baltic Sea Cooperation, and that this in turn will lead to increased visibility and awareness of the Council.

Baltic Sea Calendar 2005

MARCH

14-15 Joensuu, Finland
CBSS Working Group on Democratic Institutions (WGDI) meeting and seminar on Good Administration from a legal point of view.

17-18 Warsaw, Poland
Working Group for Cooperation on Children at Risk (WGCC) meeting.

17-18 Warsaw, Poland
CBSS Working Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (WGNRS) meeting.

APRIL

4-6 Vilnius, Lithuania
Working Group on Youth Affairs (WGYA) meeting.

5-6 Olsztyn, Poland/Kaliningrad, Russia
CBSS Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting.

5-6 Olsztyn, Poland/Kaliningrad, Russia
CBSS Working Group on Economic Cooperation (WGEC) meeting.

6-9 Riga, Latvia
International Baltic IT&T Forum 2005.

11 Riga, Latvia
Senior Officials on Information Society (SOIS) meeting.

14-15, Vilnius, Lithuania
Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS) meeting of Committee of Senior Representatives.

26 Tallinn, Estonia
CBSS Working Group on Democratic Institutions (WGDI) meeting.

MAY

9-10 Sopot, Poland
22nd Baltic 21 Senior Officials Group (SOG) meeting.

9-10 Oslo, Norway
CBSS Ministers of Children and Family affairs meeting.

11-12 Sopot, Poland
CBSS Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Meeting (tbc).

12-13 Gdynia, Poland
5th Baltic Sea NGO Forum (tbc).

24-25 Szczecin, Poland
CBSS Working Group on Economic Cooperation (WGEC) meeting.



USEFUL CBSS ADDRESSES

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