

The image features a solid orange background with a complex pattern of thin, white, intersecting lines that create a grid-like or web-like structure. In the center, there is a large white circle defined by two concentric lines. Inside this circle, the text "FROM GAPS TO CAPS" is written in a bold, white, sans-serif font, arranged in four lines: "FROM", "GAPS", "TO", and "CAPS".

**FROM
GAPS
TO
CAPS**

From Gaps to Caps

Report on National Capability and Risk Assessments and related challenges in the Baltic Sea Region

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Introduction

This present paper is a report on Task C of the project “From Gaps to Caps”, funded by the European Commission DG ECHO. This first chapter of the report presents a brief overview of the project, especially on Task C, discusses the progress made so far and gives a Glossary of terms.

Objective and background of the project “From Gaps to Caps”

The project “Risk Management Capability Based on Gaps Identification in the BSR”, with the project acronym “From Gaps to Caps”, was aimed at building knowledge on disaster risk management capability assessments and to develop a more common understanding of such assessments at national level in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This was a cooperative project with partners from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden. The project was coordinated by the Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania and run for 24 months, from January 2015 to December 2016.

The project was meant to contribute to the implementation of a macro-regional civil protection strategy and joint macro-regional prevention and preparedness approach towards major hazards and emergencies as set forth under the Policy Area Secure in the 2013 Action Plan. It is built on the res-

ults of the project EUSBSR 14.3 – European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region flagship 14.3 on Macro-regional Risk Scenarios and Gaps Identification.

Among other things, the EUSBSR 14.3 project produced six scenarios (*Extreme Weather/Storm, Flooding, Forest Fire, Pandemic Flu, Accident at Sea and Nuclear Accident*) and a corresponding methodology for scenario development as well as assessments of impacts/consequences and likelihood. At the time several participating countries had just initiated or were in the process of finalizing national risk assessments in accordance with the EU Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management (SEC [2010] 1626 final) which meant that the EUSBSR 14.3 project increased awareness on cross-border dimensions of risks. The considerable flows of trade, business, migration, tourism and communications within the region imply that many hazards that were commonly analyzed from a national point of view would inevitably have dimensions extending beyond the territory of a particular nation if they were to occur in real-life. The EUSBSR 14.3 project also provided a venue for exchanges on experiences and ideas with regard to a risk assessment *methodology* in the national contexts. Today, a greater number of the countries concerned (Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Norway) have submitted information on such national risk assessments to the

European Commission or will do so in the near future. One insight from the EUSBSR 14.3 project as well as from national risk assessments in the region, is the need for developing assessments of risk in close connection to assessments of *capability*.


A starting point for the current project *From Gaps to Caps*, is that risk assessments, ultimately, are means to provide answers to more fundamental questions of civil protection and disaster management such as *Do we have the capability/capabilities needed to deal with the risks we are currently facing?* Assessments of risk and capabilities are interlinked as we need to make at least implicit assumptions on capabilities when we develop risk-scenarios and/or assess the likelihood and impacts of disasters and - the other way around - capabilities must be understood in relation to risks. *From Gaps to Caps* suggested that the available sources of knowledge on risk management capability could be roughly divided into three intersecting categories: i. e. scenario analyses, evaluations of exercises and studies of real-life experiences (See figure 1). According to a recent review by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (2014), there is no unified method or common indicator system for measuring the overall capability of civil protection/emergency preparedness in Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK.

Presumably, this observation holds true for the BSR, too. With a view to the guidelines for assessments of risk management capability in accordance with the EU Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (1313/2013/EU), the project attempted to survey and collect data on existing ways of assessing capability in the civil protection systems of the region.

Along with relevant aspects of the EUSBSR 14.3 project as well as national risk assessments, these findings served as a basis for developing a methodology for future assessments of capability among the Baltic Sea States with a special focus on cross-border dimensions. This can include events

Figure 1

The relationship between risk and capability



occurring in one Baltic Sea State of direct impact on the territory of another/others, events in border areas, events simultaneously affecting several countries in the region and events in a Baltic Sea State affecting residents of another, temporarily abroad, as well as events occurring in one country that can be dealt with – only or more effectively – with the assistance of other countries.

The “From Gaps to Caps” project is divided into Tasks A, B, C and D as follows:

- Task A** Management and reporting to the Commission
- Task B** Publicity
- Task C** Risk management capability assessment methodology
- Task D** Comparison of evaluations of emergencies and exercises

Activities of Task C

The main objective of this report is to give a brief overview of the efforts made within Task C of the project. The main result of Task C is a proposal for a new methodology for risk and capability assessments, given in Appendix A as the document “The BSR methodology for risk and capability assessments, a first approach”. Also, Appendix B as the document “Possible future opportunities for risk and capability assessments in the BSR” provides a further discussion on this topic.

Task C is divided into the following action items:

- C.1** Task C kick off
- C.2** Preparation and dissemination of the questionnaire on capability assessments in BSR
- C.3** Seminar No. 1 on National Risk Management Capability Assessments and Guidelines/ Indicators
- C.4** Preparation of a draft report on national capability (and risk) assessments and related challenges in the BSR
- C.5** Seminar No. 2 on National Capability (and Risk) Assessments, Challenges and Opportunities in the BSR
- C.6** Final Seminar of Task C and D
- C.7** Final report and conference on the Project

Actions C1, C2, C3, C4 (this report) and C5 have already been carried out successfully (Seminar No. 2 was held in Tallinn, not Vilnius as originally planned). Thus, the project group has had several formal meetings, the kick-off meeting in Reykjavik in March 2015, Seminar No. 1, held in Riga in May 2015, Seminar No. 2, held in Tallinn in November 2015, and an additional fourth meeting, Seminar No. 3, was held in Hamburg in June 2016. Also, a final Seminar was held in Vilnius in September 2016. The final conference took place in November 2016 in Stockholm.

A summary of the achievements of the five meetings (in Reykjavik, Riga, Tallinn, Hamburg and Vilnius) is given below:

- A common understanding was achieved on the objectives, aims, tasks, financial matters, different approaches in the partner countries on risk management capability and assessments;
- A questionnaire was produced and information collected on national risk assessment plans and capability assessments in each partner country (this information is presented in Appendix C). The collected data showed that there are differences in development phases in this field and diverse point of view;
- The overview of experiences/approaches across the BSR based on submitted and discussed information has been disseminated. Some countries have methodologies developed for risk management capability assessment but some partners do not have particular/structural methodologies; applying ad-hoc approaches (these do not have a methodology but assessment has been carried out);
- The experiences on capability assessments (e.g. Sweden, the Netherlands, UK) has been presented and discussed;
- The use of the EU guidelines on risk management capability assessment was discussed and examined as a practical tool (the logic of provided questions, the meaning of questions etc.)
- All partners have completed a questionnaire on the use

of the EU guidelines on risk management capability assessment, the results are shown in Appendix D.

- The partners agreed in the Tallinn meeting to conduct a workshop in which one scenario from the 14.3 project (the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario) was to be analyzed using a new methodology for capability assessment, based on a simplified version of the Swedish methodology.
- The new methodology for capability assessment has been produced and introduced to the partners and used by the partners to analyze the Extreme weather/storm scenario. The new proposed methodology is presented in Appendix A.
- An additional seminar was held in Hamburg in June 2016.
- A final Seminar of Task C and Task D was held in Vilnius in September 2016

The above actions and findings will be further discussed in the following chapters of this report.

Overview of this report

The project plan gives the following description of Action C4:

Name of the action: Preparation of a draft report on national capability (and risk) assessments and related challenges in the BSR.

Description: Based on conclusions of Seminar No. 1, possibly supplemented by a survey among all project partners, a report on national capability assessments and risk assessments is to be drafted. The report will give an overview of relevant aspects of the civil protection systems involved, differences and similarities and identify main challenges and opportunities for improvement with a special focus on cross-border dimensions (of both risks and capabilities). The work will be carried out virtually.

This report aims at fulfilling the description given above.

Chapter 2 describes existing capability assessment approaches in the EU/BSR (5 Nordic countries, 3 Baltic as well as Poland and Germany). Also, approaches used in the UK and the Netherlands were discussed.

In **Chapter 3**, results from a questionnaire completed by the project partners are presented (full results given in Appendix C) and opportunities for improvements with focus on cross border dimensions are given.

Chapter 4 discusses the EU Guideline for assessment of risk management capability [3]. All project partners answered the 51 questions given in the guidelines and an analysis of their answers is presented. Full results are given in Appendix D.

Chapter 5 presents a methodology for scenario analysis and capability assessment, and describes an Extreme Weather/ Storm Scenario, which later was used by all project partners for a case study at a project meeting held in Hamburg in June 2016. The methodology is presented in Appendix A.

Chapter 6 gives some conclusions, lessons learned and discusses these.

Glossary

All entries are introduced in alphabetical order. There are some different sources of terms and definitions. Because of this, the selection of definitions were made by giving the European Guidelines the first place in the hierarchy. Then the most clear definitions from ISO or UN standards were chosen. The sources of definitions are indicated in brackets. The entries on ‘capability’ and ‘susceptibility’ which are not standardized are taken from scientific articles.

Capability – how well one or more actors (agencies, municipalities, private enterprises etc.) in society – or society in its entirety – manage to *prevent* emergencies or disasters in the first place, and, in case they still occur, *prepare and respond* to the incident and manage to carry out ordinary, prioritized, activities. (*MSB, Sweden*)

Capacity – combination of all the strengths and resources within an organization community or society that can reduce the level of risk or the effects of a crisis. (*ISO 22300 – Social security terminology*)

Consequences – are the negative effects of a disaster expressed in terms of human impacts, economic and environmental impacts, political/social impacts. (*ISO 31010*).

Disaster – a serious disruption of the functioning of community or society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the effected community or society to cope with using its own resources (UN/ISDR 2004) in (*“Risk, hazard and people’s vulnerability to natural hazards: a review of definitions, concepts, and data”. Technical Report January 2004 EC Directorate - General Joint Research Center EUR 21410 EN*).

Hazard – source of potential harm. (*ISO 22300 – Social security terminology*)

Probability – measure of chance of occurrence expressed as the number between 0 and 1 where 0 is impossibility and 1 is absolute certainty. (*ISO 22300 Societal Security – Terminology*)

Resilience – the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in timely and efficient manner including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structure and function. (*UN/ISDR, 2009 in “Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management” Brussels 21.12.2010 SEC (2010) 1626 Final*)

Risk – a combination of the consequences of an event (hazard) and the associated likelihood/probability of its occurrence. (ISO 31010 in *“Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management” Brussels 21.12.2010 SEC (2010) 1626 Final*)

Risk assessment – the overall process of finding, recognizing and describing risks. (ISO 31010 in *“Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management” Brussels 21.12.2010 SEC (2010) 1626 Final*)

Risk management – coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk. (*ISO 22300 Societal Security – Terminology*)

Risk Scenario – a presentation of one single- risk or multi – risk situation leading to significant impacts, selected for the purpose of assessing in more detail a particular type of risk for which it is representative or constitutes an informative example or illustration. (*ISO 22300 Societal Security – Terminology*)

Scenario – pre-planned story line that drives an exercise, the stimuli used to achieve exercise objectives. (*ISO 22300 Societal Security – Terminology*)

Susceptibility – refers “wholly to behavioral”, social, political, industrial and commercial pressure upon the physically vulnerable and can be defined, in its own right, as brought about as part of today’s ‘fundamental process’ [...] In practice susceptibility has come to be paired with vulnerability” (*H. Lindbom, H. Tehler, K. Eriksson, T. Aven “The capability concept – on how to define and describe capability in relation to risk, vulnerability and resilience. In Reliability Engineering and System Safety 135 (2015) 45-54*)


Vulnerability – the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or assets that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard. (UNISDR, 2009) In probability based/quantitative risk assessments the term vulnerability expresses part or percentage of exposure that is likely to be lost due to a certain hazard. (*“Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management” Brussels 21.12.2010 SEC (2010) 1626 Final*)

Existing capability assessment approaches in the EU and BSR

According to the questionnaire discussed in, Chapter 3, Sweden is the only country participating in this project that works systematically on capability assessments linked with the national risk assessment plan. Norway is considering such an approach, Estonia and Germany are doing partial capability assessments.

Authorities in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also developed a methodology for assessing capability and experts have considered these to be some of the most advanced in Europe. To expand the view of the project beyond the BSR, representatives from the UK and the Dutch authorities were invited to the project meeting in Riga in May 2015 and presented their methodology there.

Figure 2.1
Overview of the UK methodology for capability assessment



In this chapter we shall discuss very briefly the methodologies used in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. Further, we shall very briefly describe some less formal methods used in some of the other participating countries.

Capability assessment in the UK

The UK Cabinet Office [5] gave a lecture in May 2015 on the methodology used in the UK for capability assessments. Figure 2.1 on page 13 gives an overview of the methodology.

The figure shows how the National Risk Assessment is used to identify consequences common to most risks, and how this is a basis for creating the National Resilience Planning Assumptions. These are then used to develop core capabilities for responding to emergencies, resulting in a National Resilience Capabilities Programme.

Capability assessment in the Netherlands

The Ministry of Security and Justice, in the Netherlands [6], presented the methodology used in the Netherlands for capability assessments.

The Dutch authorities have identified 5 national security interests:

- Territorial security
- Physical safety
- Economical security
- Ecological security
- Social and political stability

Using these, and the all-hazards approach, they define capabilities as the following:

- General: strategic planning, policy, risk management system, monitoring, information, trends, financial, international relations
- Proactivity & prevention: avoiding threats, mitigating consequences, critical infrastructure protection, resilience
- Preparation: planning, coordination, training & exercise, emergency supplies
- Response: crisis information infrastructure, alert system, crisis decision-making and crisis coordination, public crisis communication, incident fighting, search and rescue
- Recovery & after-care: damage reparation and the consequences - return of inhabitants, economic recovery, psychological and social aftercare, compensation loss sustained

Figure 2.2 below gives an overview of the work process. The figure describes a four step methodology:

National Risk Profile

- From a yearly report to reporting once every 4 years. Giving a general overview. Maintaining all-hazards approach. Threat themes (8 to 10) will form the heart of the new report.
- Take into account regional risk profiles and vice versa
- Risks and phenomena are monitored constantly and can lead to special periodic reports.

Capability Overview

- Systematic overview and monitoring of all actions/ programs to strengthen national security

Critical Infrastructure Protection Assessment

- (Re)-assessment and analysis of critical infrastructure protection




Figure 2.2
Overview of the Dutch methodology for capacity assessments

Capability Program

Based on:

- National risk profile/capability overview/critical infrastructure protection
- Technological developments and trends
- Lessons learned (national and international)
- Capability analysis
- Aimed to have actual influence

A further and more detailed description of the methodology used in the Netherlands for capability assessments is given in [6].

Capability assessment in Sweden

In Sweden there is a relatively long tradition of making capability assessments [7]. The development of the methodology is however ongoing and will also in the future be further developed. So far Sweden has been working with five dimensions of capability: management/leadership, cooperation/collaboration, information/communication, knowledge and competence, and resources. Sweden also started to develop so called “capability goals” since there has been a need identified to measure capability *in relation to scale (reliability)*.

Since the 1990’s the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) (and its predecessors) has produced and delivered a

national capability assessment to the government, using different methods. Since 2012 the national assessment sent to the government each year covers risk assessments as well as capability assessments. These National Risk and Capability Assessments are based on, primarily, risk and vulnerability analyses and capability assessments from public actors on both the local, regional and central levels in Sweden (these are obligatory according to law).

Apart from these documents, the national risk and capability assessment delivered to the government each year is based on different scenario analyses. In order to be able to do these scenario analyses the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has been working in a workshop format (which is an important input but not the only one). In this format MSB has done a form of stakeholder analysis, where 15 to 39 people have represented various societal sectors such as energy, transport, finance and commerce, health services, information and communication, food and agriculture, as well as the public sector. During the workshops, the aim to create a common understanding was set (before, during and after the imagined crisis) of the responsibilities/tasks in the scenario, critical resources (priorities need to be made), interactions between stakeholders and impacts for each stakeholder. Moreover, MSB had discussed the impacts of the scenario on the Swedish national values of protection: 1) the life and health of people, 2) the possibility for society to function

properly, 3) democracy, rule of law and human rights, 4) economy and environment, 5) national sovereignty.

From 2016 on, the material on which the national assessment is based upon will be more systematically expanded. This will include assessments from both exercises and real events, such as the immense forest fire in Västmanland (a region west of Stockholm and Uppsala) in summer 2014, and the oil disaster on the west coast of Sweden in 2011 (affecting the island of Tjörn very negatively). As it concerns the documentation of exercises, every year the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency supports and supervises numerous exercises all around Sweden, mostly regional ones but also some local ones. Every fourth year a large national exercise focused on overview and control of/collaboration between different organizations, both public and private, is also carried out, involving several municipalities, one or more county administrative boards, different state agencies as well as parts of the Swedish Government Offices. The most recent one was held in 2016 and dealt with scenarios in regards to heavy flooding and high levels of sea water that will affect the western parts of Sweden and lead to disturbances in, for instance, the systems of transportation and food supplies. The capabilities in focus of this exercise are the ones concerning management/leadership, cooperation/collaboration and information/communication. Moreover, the capability to receive help and support from other countries during a crisis will be tested.

Capability assessment in Norway

The Norwegian approach to capability assessments has vital societal functions as a basis or point of departure. Based on a description of the basic needs in the society/population (food, water, heating, safety etc.) Norway has defined and identified a number of vital societal functions (at the moment 18). In this context a societal function is defined as vital if a failure threatens the population's basic needs. These vital societal functions have been operationalized in capabilities that express what capacities the society must maintain to ensure that the vital needs of the population are taken care of.

Currently, Norway is about to identify and designate in more detail vital deliveries necessary to maintain capability. This kind of mapping of the chain of values that lies behind each capability, including an assessment of vulnerability and dependencies, is necessary to conduct, in order to obtain a sufficient overview and control of the vital societal function in question.

In the National Risk Analysis (NRA) Norway explores the possibilities of using/integrating this framework (of vital societal functions and capabilities) in the risk analysis of scenarios.

In the NRA the focus is on consequence assessments of worst-case scenarios/serious events. In these assessments, capabilities have been implicitly evaluated as part of the consequence assessment. But capability/ies as such have not been systematically analyzed. In future scenarios/analyses, Norway will explore the possibility of making a more detailed assessment of how vital societal functions relevant to the scenario that is the object of analysis, will be challenged. This assessment will include an assessment of which capabilities must be held in order to maintain the functions. This will give added value to the risk analysis – as a basis for implementing prevention and preparedness measures – but again, the focus of the NRA will be on consequence, not on capability.

This means, Norway has not developed a specific capability assessment method, but we explore possibilities to do more systematic assessments of capability as part of the risk analysis.

Within the “vital societal functions”, the term *capability* frames what enterprises must be capable to ensure/deliver in order to maintain the critical societal function in question.

Capability assessment in Iceland

A very wide variety of natural hazards can affect Iceland. Some examples include volcanic eruptions with lava flow, volcanic eruptions with huge ash clouds, volcanic eruptions under glaciers, causing glacial flooding, extreme weather, avalanches, and earthquakes, to mention only a few types of natural hazards. Also, these events occur very regularly.

Iceland has produced a National Risk Assessment Plan, in accordance to the EU, where possible hazards are described.

Since Iceland has a very small population and limited capabilities in terms of manpower, the tendency with regard to capability assessments has been done by “learning by doing”. Therefore, capability assessments are very much based on former hazard incidents. These are regularly revised and amended.

Capability assessment in Finland

In Finland, the preparedness of the different administrative branches is harmonized in the Security Strategy for Society. The goal of the strategy is to ensure the functioning of society, safeguard Finland’s national sovereignty and promote the security and well-being of its citizens. To reach this goal the functions vital to society are defined in this Security Strategy;

the continuation of the basic matters that must be secured in all conditions. Also, the areas for which the different ministries are responsible are described as well as who will be responsible for directing activities if a crisis occurs. Probable threat models and threat situations are discussed to facilitate preparedness.

The Security Strategy for Society is based on a decision in principle of the Government which provided guidelines for and the harmonization of preparedness in the administrative branches and gives information of the grounds of preparedness also to other actors. The authorities decide on and are responsible for the implementation of the goals of decision in principle.

The functions vital to society consist of what keeps the wheels of a secure daily life turning: a well-functioning judicial system, sufficient border surveillance, smooth traffic and a clean living environment. When the basic functions of society are in order it is possible to return to normal life after crises without losing the firm ground on which society rests. The importance of the functions vital to society becomes evident when something goes badly wrong; for example, an extensive power failure or when a major accident occurs.

The functions vital to society must be secured at all times: in normal conditions as well as in crises. In the Security Strategy for Society, the vital functions form the basis for

preparedness. The following are regarded as vital functions:

- 1 Management of Government affairs
- 2 International activity
- 3 Finland's defense capability
- 4 Internal security
- 5 Functioning of the economy and infrastructure
- 6 The population's income security and capability to function
- 7 Psychological crisis tolerance

In the Finnish approach, the authority who is responsible for a certain function in normal conditions continues to be responsible for it also in emergency conditions. Other authorities support the competent authority as necessary.

Ministries: The ministries guide their respective administrative branches to prepare for disturbances and emergency conditions. In the Security Strategy for Society, the ministries have been allocated strategic tasks with which the functions vital to society are secured in all security situations. Strategic tasks include, for example, securing power supply, managing migration and maintaining maritime search and rescue.

The heads of preparedness and the preparedness secretariats in the ministries cooperate with preparedness committees.

The network of the heads of preparedness and the preparedness secretaries was utilized in the preparation of national risk assessment work. The Ministry of the Interior coordinated the work, and responsibility of each scenario was given to the ministry that had primarily been responsible for the defined risk scenario. The ministries were using the best possible expertise of their administrative sector in analyzing the probabilities and consequences of the scenarios. The values of the probabilities and consequences that were used in all the scenarios have been agreed upon in the working group.

Capability assessment in Denmark

Denmark does not have a common approach for capability assessment. However, each fire and rescue service makes a risk-based description and assessment for the area it covers in Denmark. A part of this description is to assess what capabilities each fire station needs to have to handle the risks. That could be relocation of materials and how many fire trucks are needed. That means that Denmark mostly sees capacity as the material and staff etc. needed to be able to handle a risk identified.

Capability assessment in Estonia

Estonia does not have a common approach for capability assessment. Capability assessment is partially covered by vital services (vital societal functions) risk assessment, emergency risk assessment and a summary of Estonian national emergency risk assessments (risk-reducing measures).

Both of the above-mentioned risk analyses are made according to the Emergency Act and are linked to the national risk assessment.

Vital services are services the interruption of which would endanger the life or health of people, paralyse the functioning of the state or decrease the feeling of security in society. Providers of such services are obliged to prevent interruptions or ensure swift restoration of services where/when necessary. State institutions and enterprises have specific tasks in connection with ensuring the functioning of services, for instance the preparation of risk analyses with regard to services and specific plans. Estonia has defined 46 vital services in its Emergency Act. A risk assessment of vital services continuous operation is a document describing the risks, probability and the possible consequences of a partial or complete interruption in the provision of a vital service. Vital services assessments are connected with an emergency risk assessment process (one impact assessment categories).

Emergency risk assessments are drawn upon the basis of a risk assessment methodology which is established by the regulation of the Minister of the Interior, which sets out the components of a risk assessment, the criteria for evaluating its probability and consequences, and how the measures which prevent emergencies or alleviate its consequences, are planned. Preventative measures focus on avoiding emergencies and alleviating measures focus on reducing or avoiding the possible negative impact of emergencies. A list of emergencies for which risk assessments are drawn up has been set out on the basis of the law. Risk assessments are drawn up for 27 emergencies. In each field, risk assessment is drawn up by a competent body, which includes bodies and persons with information needed for drawing up the assessment. Risk assessments are regularly reviewed every two years.

The Ministry of Interior then prepares a summary on the basis of submitted risk assessments, which is submitted to the Government of the Republic and to the crisis management committee of the Government of the Republic for approval. The purpose of the risk assessment summary is to give the government a comprehensive and comparative overview of emergencies with the greatest risk in Estonia. On the governmental level, it is also important to define priority activities which decrease risks and are necessary for preventing emergency situations and/or mitigation of consequences.

The Emergency Act is currently being amended by the Parliament. In this context, the risk assessment methodology is being updated. The Minister of the Interior establishes by regulation new requirements for emergency risk assessment and risk arrangements. This regulation will provide a basis for the capability assessment. Capability assessment describes emergency prevention and response activities, analyzes the preparedness and capability gaps, describes the preventive measures and the estimated cost of those measures and designates the responsible authorities.

Capability assessment describes the following capabilities:

- 1 equipment and supplies;
- 2 staff;
- 3 training;
- 4 agreements and cooperation;
- 5 management;
- 6 other important capabilities to prevent and deal with emergencies.

Capability assessment in Latvia

Latvia does not have a common approach for capability assessment or so called methodology. Instead, the National Security Law prescribes that institutions, basically all ministries and institutions, are responsible to forecast, in a timely

manner, and to prevent internal and external threats to the State. Additionally, the National Security Law sets out obligation to ministries in their respective competence sectors to develop respective contingency management plans or civil protection plans incorporating prevention, preparedness, and response and recovery measures. For disaster management purposes, the State Civil Protection Plan has been developed and is revised annually.

The newly adopted Civil Protection and Disaster Management Law prescribes clear disaster management coordination tasks to ministries and local municipalities, according to their respective competencies, binding to organize and carry out disaster risk assessment; and based on the outcome of risk assessment plan measures for all of the disaster management cycle. they have to identify and plan potential resources required to carry out disaster management measures; and propose new legislation or amend existing ones in their respective area of competences. For the implementation of disaster risk assessment process, a Cabinet regulation will be established to draw up a common risk assessment methodology to ensure a comprehensive approach. Planned regulation will define the most important components of a risk assessment, risk identification and risk analysis to gain comparable data. Performed risk assessments will be reviewed every four years. The Ministry of the Interior will prepare the summary on the risk assessments and incor-

porate results in the State Civil Protection Plan, which will be submitted to the Government for approval. The Regulation also prescribes the process of evaluation of defined disaster management measures by organizing regular civil protection exercises.

Capability assessment in Lithuania

Lithuania does not have an approach for capability assessment, however all ministries, public authorities and institutions, municipalities, and some essential entities have to group and analyze their managed resources (or plan to invoke additional resources) during compiling and updating their emergency management plans.

There is a methodology for emergency management plans compiled for ministries, public authorities and institutions, municipalities, entities. These emergency management plans should consist of such chapters as risk analysis of the most probable events, scale of their consequences (human and economic losses etc.), organization and alert of personnel and residents, operational information about threatening or occurred emergency, procedures of operational information dissemination and exchange among interested institutions, organization of resident evacuation, coordination of different responders during emergency management, organization of maintaining the public order etc.

In 2010, by Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania a State Emergency Management Plan was approved, according to the National Risk Assessment, 17 emergencies were identified, as well as, responsible and supporting institutions (ministries, public authorities) for those emergencies. Emergencies are divided into natural, technical, ecological, social, and others. The Organization of the state level emergency management consists of alert and information, rescue work organization and coordination of actions, organization of communication, provision of material resources and use of them, protection of population, organization of maintaining the public order, organization of healthcare, also procedures of request and acceptance of international assistance, strategic communication. The effectiveness of the emergency management plans are tested periodically during exercises of different levels (table top exercise, functional, full scale exercise).

Capability assessment in Germany

Overview: Germany is a federal republic of 16 constituent states and each state has its own parliament and government, and a high degree of autonomy.

Most states are divided into administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke), and each district is divided into administrative counties (Landkreise) and county boroughs (kreisfreie

Städte). The local self-government (municipalities “Kommunen”) administrates amongst other functions local transport and road construction, electricity, water and gas supply, sewerage and the protection of daily life.

According to the respective laws of each “Land”, the first authority in charge during a peacetime disaster is the cognizant rural district, county or municipal authority. The director of administration for each of these authorities manages the local response to emergencies and disasters. According to the needs of the situation, a staff composed of the officials of the director’s own administration, representatives of other authorities and services as well as other organisations involved in disaster management assist the director in carrying out the administrative duties. For the technical and tactical execution of the required measures, the director appoints a director of operations, who is assisted by a staff that includes representatives of the organisations and units participating in the operation (e.g. the police, fire departments, non-governmental organisations and private enterprises). When a disaster affects several districts or exceeds the capabilities of the local government, the next highest hierarchical authority ensures the coordination.

In times of war, the federal government is overall responsible for the civil defence.

Moreover, civil protection in Germany is carried out at each administrative level according to the tasks laid down in the respective laws. The operational organisations perform tasks ordered by civil protection authorities. When conducting operations on site, the competent authorities are supported by fire-fighters, private relief organisations and NGOs (at federal level).


The overall objective of German civil emergency planning is to protect the State and its citizens. The operational responsibilities for the protection of the population in times of emergency lie with the constitutional states as representatives of the federal government. Federal preparedness for the protection of the population during war or imminent threat of war is regarded as “extended” civil emergency planning and the responsibility of the federal state. All civil protection authorities contribute in the form of planning, administration and material resources to the prevention of disaster management during and in the recovery period from all kind of disasters and emergencies and during armed conflicts.

An inter-ministerial coordination group may be set up within the federal Ministry of the Interior when the catastrophe exceeds the ability of a “Land” to cope with it or has spread beyond its territorial boundaries. In such cases, the federal Ministry of the Interior, in liaison with other federal ministries and the other states, ensures the coordination of assistance to the “Land” affected by the disaster.

At each level the coordination among organisations is ensured by the respective competent authority.

According to the German Constitution, the states are responsible for the management of all kinds of disasters in a peacetime situation. There are no structural differences between the different kinds of disasters.

Figure 2.3. Structure of Civil Protection in Germany*



Risk Assessment and partially Capability Assessment:

Independently of the self-administration of the constituent states and their local self-governments, the federal government support risk assessments and in case of a disaster with their own operational forces (e.g. the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), the federal police, and, with certain limitations as regards the use of weapons, the Armed Forces) when asked for assistance, and with services provided by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe – BBK).

Hence, by order of the federal government, the BBK generate a methodology for risk-assessment (*Methode für die Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz /Method of risk assessment in civil protection*).

Annually the federal government assesses risks and reports this assessment to the Bundestag (House of Representatives). This national “report of risk assessment in civil protection“ contains the results of the 16 risk assessments of the federal states. This report is the basis for any political discussion of capability and capacity.

For the contribution of the federal states, the method of risk analysis will be adapted in cooperation with the federal state to the needs of the potential users. The bases for these re-



Figure 2.4
Basics Crisis Management


gions as well as level-specific adjustments are determined by applications of the method in various projects. The auspices of the risk analysis within the projects are owned by the respective state or in the respective independent city / each district. Also here the Risk Assessment is the basis for any political discussion.

Finally the local self-governments are encouraged to use this method for assessments of their needs supported by federal and local laws.

Risk and Capability Assessments mostly cover the following security interests according to different scenarios:

- Human
- Environment

Figure 2.5
Summary Capability
Assessment in
Germany



- Economy
- Infrastructure and Supply
- Intangible Articles

In consideration of these 5 security interests there are at the moment round about 75 scenarios defined by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance.

According to these specifications every federal state is recommended to do their own Risk and Capability Assessment. Even the administrative counties and local self-governments are recommended to do their own local specific assessments.

Based on these preceding assessments all levels of administration will prearrange the civil protection in their area of responsibility – supported by special units of the federal government (represented by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance).

The main references for this section are [8], [9] and [10].

Capability assessment in Poland

According to Polish legislation there is an obligation to prepare a crisis management plan which besides a general plan and functional plans (they are usually divided into sectors of responsibility) contains a risk assessment obligation. This

obligation embraces the local, regional and national level. However, there is no elaborated unified methodology of risk estimation. The authorities responsible for the protection of the population fulfill their task using their own methodologies. That is why many difficulties arise when aggregating risks from different administration levels, especially when summarizing them to define national risk. This problem arises due to the digital impossibility of comparing risks from different levels and different parts of a country. Being aware of this situation, the Polish National Research and Development Center started two years ago to finance a scientific project called “*Determining risk assessment methodology on the needs of Polish crisis management*” (MOR) which ended in summer 2015. The General result of the project is based on the methodology described in the EU Guideline and the results of the 14.3 project, that is risk estimation methodology. The MOR methodology will be implemented in the following year by the Governmental Security Center as binding law in Poland. Moreover, during the realization of the MOR project, a methodology of capability assessment has been worked out in relation to the 14.3 project’s risk assessment. The proposal indicates how to measure capability. The concept is that one can express capability as the reliability of population system protection. Comparing capability reliability to the magnitude of risk, one can create a matrix called “Crisis Matrix” which characterizes the probability of a emerging crisis situation. This crisis situation arises when the reliability

of capability is inadequate (not tolerable) to the magnitude of risk. The last issue is an ongoing process of implementation discussed nowadays at the Governmental Security Center.

Summary

The Task C project group wanted to describe and discuss the disaster management systems in the participating countries; the 5 Nordic countries, 3 Baltic countries, Poland and Germany (here referred to as the Baltic Sea Region countries, although Russia is not a part of the current project). Additionally, systems in the UK and the Netherlands were also investigated.

Through the descriptions provided, and discussions at project meetings, it is clear that some important aspects are shared between the countries regarding disaster management issues, but they also differ in a number of ways. The differing issues pertain mainly to the governance structures between the state, regional and local authorities; the cooperation between different jurisdictional levels or cross-sectoral actors; and the balance in priorities between mitigation measures, preparedness and response. The governance structure in Germany differs in the way that the regions (“Länder”) may be said to have a higher governance status than regions in other countries.

Nevertheless, some principles seem generic and common. In all of the countries, the potentially affected organizations and authorities are supposed to cater for their own preparedness, involving the development of risk and crises management plans. The role of state agencies in this respect is relatively clear; they have a duty to formulate National Risk Assessment plans and provide some measure for capability assessment (although in Germany the regions have this role). However, there is a considerable difference between the countries regarding the detailed plans and to what level such work is performed.

In this context, the project group for Task C has concluded that it would be of great benefit for the Baltic Sea Region countries if a harmonized methodology for risk and capability assessments could be formulated and developed within the region. The methodology would have to be user-friendly, practical and flexible, should be applicable at all levels of government and to all actors in the field and should allow scenario analyses as well as take experiences from exercises and emergencies into account.

Results from the questionnaire on civil protection management systems in the BSR

This chapter provides a very short description of the EU legislation on national risk assessment plans and on capability assessments. We shall describe the results from the questionnaire on the status of national risk and capability assessments in the countries participating in the project. The full answers to the questionnaire are given in Appendix C, but the main findings are summarized here.

Background: EU legislation on risk and capability assessments

In the EU, there is a wide variety of the methods used for managing civil protection. The European Union issued a staff working paper “Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management” (SEC [2010] 1626 final) [2]. The EUSBSR 14.3 project also provided a venue for exchanges on experiences and ideas with regard to risk assessment methodology in the national contexts. Most of the BSR countries have submitted information on such national risk assessments to the European Commission.

One insight from the EUSBSR 14.3 project as well as from national risk assessments in the region is the need for developing assessments of risk in close connection to assessments of capability. There is a need to provide answers to more fundamental questions on civil protection and disaster management such as “Do we have the capability/capabilities

needed to deal with the risks we are currently facing?” Assessments of risk and capabilities are interlinked as we need to make at least implicit assumptions on capabilities when we develop risk-scenarios and/or assess the likelihood and impacts of disasters and - the other way around - capabilities must be understood in relation to risks.

In view of this, the European Union presented guidelines for the assessment of risk management capability. The document referred here to as [3] is “Risk Management Capability Assessment Guidelines” (2015/C 261/03).

On the basis of this document, and using each countries national risk assessments, each of the partners went through the questions presented in [3], answered them and evaluated the questionnaire. In general, it was found that the questionnaire can be very useful when evaluating if there is capability to evaluate rescue capability and prepare civil contingency authorities to set up mechanisms to allow such capability assessments to take place. A more in-depth analysis of the questionnaire in [3] is given in Chapter 5 of this report.

However, even though the questionnaire presented in [3] can be very useful to evaluate how prepared each country is when it comes to assessing capability, it does not contain a description of a methodology for scenario analyses connected to risk

and capability assessments. Since the aim of this project is to develop a methodology for assessments of capability among the Baltic Sea States with a special focus on cross-border dimensions, the partners found that such a methodology would have to be developed. However, it should be made clear that the questionnaire in [3] can be a valuable first step toward such assessments.

Questionnaire on national risk and capability assessments

In order to get a view of the status of both national risk assessment plans and the status of capability assessments in each of the participating countries, a questionnaire was carried out. Each country was asked to answer the 10 following questions:

- ① Is your country working on a capability assessment? If yes, is it linked to the work with the national risk assessment?
- ② Will your country be using the EU guidelines questionnaire to do the capability assessment?
- ③ Do you have a method for capability assessment (developed in your own country)? If yes, can you share any documentation on this method? (links, copies etc.)
- ④ Can you please list the scenarios covered in your National Risk Assessment (Name and theme)

- ⑤ If the work in Task C of Gaps to Caps decides to focus on a specific scenario to begin with, while developing the capability assessment methodology; Which one or two of the six scenarios identified in 14.3 would you recommend starting with?
- ⑥ Will your capability assessment focus on: National capabilities? Cross-border/Macro-regional capabilities? Both?
- ⑦ Do you have a national register of capabilities (database or similar)? On national, regional or local level?
- ⑧ Do you have a definition of critical societal functions in your country? (What should be up and running in any situation)
- ⑨ Do you have a set of criteria for these critical societal functions (For example – how long can you accept being without electricity etc.?)
- ⑩ Is “acceptable risk” in any way defined in your country? (If yes, please specify how)

Some of the above were “yes” or “no” questions but others required considerable text input. The full results are given in Appendix C.

Summary of the Questionnaire

Sweden is the only project participant country that is currently working on a system-based capability assessment. Estonia, Germany and Latvia are doing partial capability assessments, but the other countries are not working on a systematic capability assessment at the moment.

Most participating countries will use the EU guidelines as a first step to do capability assessments. The exceptions are the experts from Estonia and Sweden, who will use their own national methods. Sweden is furthermore the only country that has tried and tested capability assessment methods for years. Their current method is based on previous findings, but is yet under development. Sweden is furthermore the only country with a national register of capabilities, while Estonia has a partial database of such sort.

A majority of the participating countries preferred focusing on the scenario of extreme weather/storm for any possible case study work within the project.

Most participating countries will focus primarily on national capabilities, but described interest in viewing macro-regional issues, if the From Gaps to Caps project calls for it. Finland and Latvia mentioned special intentions to review cross-border capabilities.

Lithuania and Norway have defined an “acceptable risk” in some sectors, but the other countries do not have an official explicit definition of an “acceptable risk”.

The table below shows a summary of the answers to the Questionnaire, the full answers are given in Appendix C.

Opportunities for improvements with focus on cross border dimensions

The goal of the EUSBSR 14.3 project was to develop a macro-regional risk assessment and facilitate the development of disaster prevention strategies for the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). Among other things, the EUSBSR 14.3 project produced the following six scenarios that has, or can have, a cross border dimension:

- Extreme Weather/Storm,
- Flooding,
- Forest Fire,
- Pandemic Flu,
- Accident at Sea,
- Nuclear Accident.

Also an assessment of the impacts/consequences and likelihood were performed. It has been proposed that the From Gaps to Caps project choose one of the scenarios above as

a case study when developing capability assessments with a cross-border dimension. In the questionnaire discussed above, each country was asked to choose one of the above scenarios for this purpose. Five countries chose the “Extreme Weather/Storm” scenario, while four countries chose the “Flooding” scenario. Therefore, the “Extreme Weather/Storm” scenario was chosen for a case study, when applying the capability assessment methodology developed within the project.

The “Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario” has already been described in the 14.3 project, but will be described once again in chapter 5, as well as the methodology for assessing rescue capability.

Results from the questionnaire on civil protection management systems in the BSR

Task C Questionnaire

		DK	EE	FI	DE	IS	LV	LT	NO	PL	SE
1	Is your country working on a capability assessment? If yes	No	Partially	Not yet	Partially	Not officially - some academic work	Partially	No	Not yet	Partially	Yes
2	Will your country be using the EU guidelines questionnaire to do the capability assessment?	Yes	No will use own method	Yes	Yes	Yes, partially	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No will use own method
3	Do you have a method for capability assessment (developed in your own country)? If yes, can you share any documentation on this method? (links, copies, etc.)	Not explicit, is implicit in Risk Assessment	No	No		Not officially - some academic work	No	No	No	No	Yes and it is under development
4	Can you please list the scenarios covered in your National Risk Assessment (Name and Theme)	See attachment: COMBINED QUESTIONNAIRE									
5	If the work in Task C of Gaps to Caps decides to focus on a specific scenario to begin with, while developing the capability assessment methodology; Which one or two of six scenarios identified in 14.3 would you recommend starting with?	Storm and flooding	Accident at sea	Storm	Flooding	Storm and accident at sea	Storm, flood and pandemic flu	Floods	Nuclear accident, pandemic flu and storm	Floods	Accident at sea and pandemic flu
6	Will your capability assessment focus on: National capabilities? Cross-border/ Macro-regional capabilities? Both?	Primarily national	Primarily national	Both	Primarily national	Primarily national	Primarily national	Both	Primarily national	Primarily national	Primarily national
7	Do you have a national register of capabilities (database or similar)? On national, regional or local level?	No	Partially	No		No	No	No	No		Yes
8	Do you have a definition of critical societal functions in your country? (What should be up and running in any situation)	See attachment: COMBINED QUESTIONNAIRE									
9	Do you have a set of criteria for these critical societal functions (For example how long can you accept being without electricity etc.?)	See attachment: COMBINED QUESTIONNAIRE									
10	Is "acceptable risk" in any way defined in your country? (If yes, please specify below)	No	Not explicitly	Not yet		Not explicitly	No	Yes, in national risk	Yes, in some sector		No

Discussion of the EU guidelines on risk management capability

This chapter will briefly discuss the EU document “Risk Management Capability Assessment Guidelines” (2015/C 261/03) [3] and its potential use. The document contains 51 questions that are meant to serve as a way of collecting information that can be useful as input when assessing management capability to meet disasters.

The EU Guideline was introduced to the project partners at Seminar no. 1, held in Riga, May 2015. Group discussions were performed in which project partners gave some thoughts on the relevance and clarity of each of the 51 questions.

To test the methodology, a questionnaire was circulated amongst the partners, asking them to answer the 51 questions and give comments on questions of choice. The results are described in this chapter and full results are given in Appendix D.

Despite the fact that the EU guidelines [3] assist to identify the countries’ capability to carry out qualitative capability assessments, during the project, some drawbacks were indicated and comments were documented.

The EU Guideline in brief

The EU Guideline assumes that a National Risk Assessment Plan for each EU member country has already been produced.

According to the document, risk management capability is assessed, at local and/or national level, in terms of:

- 1** technical capacity
- 2** financial capacity, and
- 3** administrative capacity,

Also, the Guideline divides the information sought into three categories, issues to do with

- a** Risk assessment,
- b** Risk management planning for prevention and preparedness, and
- c** Risk prevention and preparedness measures.

The 51 questions are divided into these categories a)-c), in which the questions 1-16 belong to category a) (Risk assessment), questions 17-32 b) (Risk management planning for prevention and preparedness), and questions 33-51 belong to category c) (Risk prevention and preparedness measures).

Answers to the questionnaire on the EU Guideline

The project partners were asked to answer the 51 questions in the EU Guideline [3] to provide numerical answers to the questions and to give comments to some of the questions. The full results with the comments are given in Appendix D: Evaluation of EU Guideline questions.

In Figure 4.2 on page 39ff. a summary of the numerical values given by each partner is presented.

Summary of the project group comments on the EU Guideline

The EU questionnaire as presented in reference [3] has been discussed in this chapter. The methodology has been used within the project and results from all 10 project countries have been presented. All partners chose to consider the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario according to the 14.3 project when answering the questionnaire.

The levels of the capabilities of each BSR country are presented in Figure 4.2 and answers with comments are attached in Appendix D. The percentage of each possible value of all questions was assessed and the dispersion of the answers can be seen in Figure 4.2. It can be stated,

that those questions, which have a big dispersion of values, where not clear for the responders.

Capabilities of risk assessment in all countries are more or less at the same level. In a larger part of the BSR, the capacities are implemented in key areas or embedded and being improved. A larger dispersion has been observed in the assessment of the capabilities in the risk management planning area. One country could not present more than half of the answers of the second part of questionnaire. Also, there are more areas, where capacities are not identified or not considered suitable to be developed. The last part of the questionnaire also presents a large dispersion of the levels in the field of capabilities of prevention and preparedness measures' implementation.

Overall, the EU guidelines were practically tested and presented a primary view of assessed capabilities in BSR.

Simultaneously, all project partners were asked to summarize their impressions of the application of the EU Guidelines questionnaire in a SWOT Structure (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) regarding. The pros and cons are presented in the Figure 4.1.

One of the conclusions of this work is that it is important to distinguish between the two types of methodologies discussed in the context of capability assessments. On the one hand there is the methodology described in [3], the EU questionnaire, where the purpose is to estimate to what extent a given country is prepared to assess capability. On the other hand there are more comprehensive methodologies, where the purpose is to analyze a given scenario and conduct a risk and capability assessment with the aim of preventing and responding to crises. Such a methodology is discussed in the next chapter of this report and is presented in Appendix A.

The results show that the EU questionnaire [3] can be a very valuable tool when estimating to what extent a given country is prepared to assess capability. The methodology can also be used as a first step in a more comprehensive capability assessment.

In order to assess disaster management capabilities, a number of possible hazardous scenarios must be described and analyzed. No single methodology for scenario analysis has been presented or agreed upon in previous work of this nature in the Baltic Sea Region.

Figure 4.1. SWOT

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
- Thorough detailed	- Too abstract content of questions	- Opportunity to adapt to national CP system	- Lack of experience in RMC assessment
- Possibility to compare data at cross-border level	- Too broad questions	- Opportunity to determine pros and cons of CP system	- Use of other methods
- Possibility to search proper expertise	- Several questions in one	- Initiation of self improvement	- Misunderstandings with definitions
- Coherent implementation of planned measures at national level	- Unclear final recipient of questionnaire outcome	- Easier cooperation among MS	- Subjectivity
	- Unclear inapplicability	- Make use of experts and specific knowledge	- Misinterpretation of prevention and preparedness measures
	- Possible inaccurate data because of different approaches		- Financial resources

**CAPABILITIES' LEVEL IN THE BSR
ACCORDING TO EU GUIDELINES
(STORM SCENARIO)**




Figure 4.2
Numerical results of the
51 EU questions from the
project partners

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR						
Question		level																
Risk Assessment	Question 1: Does the risk assessment fit within an overall framework?	4	3	1	4	3	3	2	4	4	3	40%	40%	10%	10%			
	Question 2: Are clearly defined responsibilities and roles/functions assigned to the relevant entities participating in the risk assessment?	4	3	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	60%	30%	10%				
	Question 3: Are the responsibilities to assess specific risks allocated to the most relevant entities?	4	1	2	3.5	4	4	4	4	4	2	3	50%	20%	20%	10%		
	Question 4: Has the cross-sectorial dimension of risks been integrated in the risk assessments?	2	2	2	4	n/a	2	3	3	4	4	3	30%	20%	40%	10%		
	Question 5: Is the distribution of responsibilities for the assessment of the risks regularly reviewed?	4	1	-	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	60%	20%	10%	10%		
	Question 6: Are the experts responsible for the risk assessment(s) adequately informed, trained and experienced in the assessment of risks?	2	1	-	2	n/a	4	4	4	3	4	1	30%	10%	20%	20%	10%	10%
	Question 7: Are relevant stakeholders involved in the risk assessment process?	3	4	2	1.5	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	50%	30%	10%	10%		
	Question 8: Is the necessary administrative capacity available to communicate the results of risk assessments to the public?	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	2	4	3	2	30%	30%	40%			
	Question 9: Is the necessary administrative capacity available to communicate internally the results of risk	3	3	2	2.5	n/a	4	4	4	4	3	2	30%	30%	40%	10%		

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR			
	Question	level													
Risk Assessment	Question 10: Are the results of risk assessments integrated in a risk communication strategy?	3	1	1	1	2	3	2	4	1	1	10%	20%	20%	50%
	Question 11: Has the national or sub-national entity developed a methodology for risk assessment? Is this methodology laid down or published and what are the key elements of this methodology?	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	2	80%	10%	10%	
	Question 12: Has the cross-border dimension of risks been integrated in the risk assessments?	3	1	2	2	n/a	3	3	3	3	1	50%	20%	10%	10%
	Question 13: Is infrastructure included in the assessment of risks?	4	3	4	1	4	4	4	4	4	3	70%	20%	10%	
	Question 14: Is relevant ICT infrastructure available to carry out risk assessments?	3	1	3	1	4	4	4	4	3	1	40%	30%	30%	
	Question 15: Is appropriate information and data (including historical data) available to carry out risk assessments?	3	3	3.5	1	4	4	2	4	2	2	30%	30%	30%	10%
	Question 16: Is the appropriate financial capacity available to carry out and update work on risk assessments?	3	1	4	1	n/a	4	4	4	4	1	50%	10%	30%	10%

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR					
Question		level															
Risk Management Planning	Question 17: Are clearly defined responsibilities and roles/functions assigned to the entities participating in the planning of risk prevention and preparedness measures?	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	2	50%	40%	10%			
	Question 18: Are the responsibilities to plan for specific risks ensured and regularly assessed?	3	3	4	2.5	3	4	4	4	3	2	40%	40%	20%			
	Question 19: Are sufficient experts available to carry out the planning of prevention and preparedness measures based on the identified risks in the risk assessment?	3	1	-	n/a	3	4	4	4	3	2	30%	30%	10%	10%	10%	
	Question 20: Is there effective training available for the experts at different levels responsible for the planning of prevention and preparedness measures?	2	2	-	n/a	3	4	3	3	4	1	30%	30%	20%	10%	10%	
	Question 21: Are the experts involved in the planning of prevention and preparedness measures informed about the overall policy objectives/priorities related to disaster risk management?	3	4	2	2.5	4	4	4	4	3	1	50%	20%	20%	10%		
	Question 22: Is there a process in place to ensure that the knowledge of experts tasked with the planning of prevention and preparedness measures is preserved and further developed?	2	2	-	n/a	n/a	4	2	4	3	1	20%	10%	30%	10%	20%	10%
	Question 23: Do the different responsible entities have methodologies developed for risk management planning? What are the key elements of these methodologies?	2	2	-	n/a	3	3	4	4	2	1	20%	20%	30%	10%	10%	10%
	Question 24: Do methodologies for risk management planning include the identification of infrastructure relevant for the mitigation of identified risks?	3	2	3	2	4	4	4	4	2	1	40%	20%	30%	10%		
	Question 25: Are the relevant public and private stakeholders informed and involved in the planning process?	3	2	-	2	4	2	4	4	2	2	30%	10%	50%	10%		

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR					
Question	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level						
Risk Management Planning	Question 26: Are any of the risks identified in the risk assessments shared with public or private companies, and if so, how is it ensured that the planning of prevention and preparedness measures by the public and these companies is encouraged?	3	3	3.5	2	4	2	4	4	3	1		30%	40%	20%	10%	
	Question 27: Are the national or sub-national entities involved in cross-border planning of prevention and preparedness measures?	3	3	3	3	n/a	4	3	4	3	2		20%	60%	10%	10%	
	Question 28: Are relevant stakeholders, including citizens, informed about the key elements of risk management planning?	2	1	-	2	2	-	3	4	2	1		10%	10%	40%	20%	20%
	Question 29: Are equipment and tools needed to support and/or carry out the planning of prevention and preparedness measures available?	3	1	-	1	4	-	4	3	2	2		20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
	Question 30: As part of the planning process, are financing needs for the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures estimated and possible sources of financing identified?	3	1	-	3	n/a	-	3	n/a	3	2		40%	10%	10%	20%	20%
	Question 31: As part of the planning process, are future investment plans and the possible role of private sector financing considered?	2	1	-	n/a	n/a	3	3	n/a	3	1		30%	10%	20%	30%	10%
	Question 32: As part of the planning process, are procedures or plans identified or established ahead to ensure financing is in place for the prevention and preparedness measures needed to mitigate the identified risks?	2	1	-	1	n/a	-	3	n/a	3	1		20%	10%	30%	20%	20%

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR					
Question	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level						
Implementation of prevention and preparedness measures	Question 33: Is the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures linked to the risk management planning? Is it part of a strategy or policy and was a methodology defined?	2	3	1	2	n/a	3	3	4	3	1						
	Question 34: Are methods for damage and human loss reporting developed and are the costs of damages estimated, documented and stored?	2	4	3	3	2	4	3	4	3	2						
	Question 35: Are clearly defined responsibilities and roles/functions assigned to the entities participating in the implementation of risk prevention and preparedness measures?	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	3						
	Question 36: Is the distribution of responsibilities of experts involved in the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures up to date and are sufficient resources available to implement prevention and preparedness measures based on the planning process?	3	4	-	1	3	4	3	4	2	2						
	Question 37: Are the experts responsible for the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures adequately informed, trained, experienced?	2	3	-	1	3	4	3	1	3	2						
	Question 38: Are the relevant stakeholders informed and involved in the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures?	3	2	-	3	4	4	3	4	3	3						
	Question 39: Is the national or sub-national entity involved in the implementation of cross-border measures for prevention and preparedness?	3	4	2.5	3	n/a	4	3	4	3	3						
	Question 40: Is the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures by these public or private stakeholders done in sufficient quality to achieve the expected risk mitigation results?	3	4	-	n/a	4	-	3	4	2	2						
												10%	40%	20%	20%	10%	
												30%	40%	30%			
												30%	50%	20%			
												30%	30%	20%	10%	10%	
												10%	40%	20%	20%	10%	
												30%	40%	10%	10%		
												30%	50%	10%	10%		
												30%	20%	20%	10%	20%	

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR					
Question	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level	level						
Implementation of prevention and preparedness measures	Question 41: Does the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures include for example the development of procedures for early warning, activation, dispatching, deactivation or monitoring?	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	90%	10%				
	Question 42: Is the necessary information available and regularly exchanged inside the national or sub-national entity?	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	80%	20%				
	Question 43: Are communication strategies in place, including the use of various media tools (including social media) to effectively share information with citizens to increase awareness and to build trust and confidence?	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	3	3	4	70%	20%	10%			
	Question 44: Is the condition of the infrastructure relevant for the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures analysed?	3	-	2	3	4	4	4	n/a	4	2	40%	20%	20%	10%	10%	
	Question 45: Is there an inventory of available equipment needed to carry out the planned prevention and preparedness measures? Does the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures include the identification of possible equipment needs based on an existing inventory?	3	4	-	3.5	2	4	3	n/a	3	1	20%	40%	10%	10%	10%	10%
	Question 46: Are supply chain risks identified during the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures and were measures taken to reduce the risk of supply shortages?	2	3	-	3	3	-	3	n/a	4	1	10%	40%	10%	10%	10%	20%
	Question 47: Do the experts tasked with the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures have the necessary technical expertise to ensure the adequate implementation of the measures and how is ensured that this knowledge is preserved and further developed?	2	4	-	n/a	4	-	3	4	4	3	40%	20%	10%	10%	20%	

		EE	IS	NO	LT	DK	PL	FI	DE	SE	LV	Percentage in the BSR					
	Question	level															
Implementation of prevention and preparedness measures	Question 48: Do the experts tasked with the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures have the knowledge to apply procurement and logistics procedures to carry out these tasks and have the experts adequately been trained to apply these procedures?	3	3	-	3	n/a	-	3	4	3	1	10%	50%	10%	20%		
	Question 49: Do the experts tasked with the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures have the knowledge to do life cycle and surge capacity planning and are these methodologies applied to review the functioning of equipment and systems and to be able to increase capacity in the case of an emergency?	1	1	-	1	n/a	-	3	4	2	2	10%	10%	20%	30%	10%	20%
	Question 50: When carrying out prevention and preparedness measures needed to reduce, adapt to and mitigate the identified risks, are a budget, a legal base and procedures identified or established to plan ahead for flexible resource allocation?	3	1	3	2.5	n/a	4	3	4	3	1	20%	40%	10%	10%	10%	
	Question 51: Does the implementation of prevention and preparedness measures include the preparation of agreements with stakeholders that regulate the sharing of costs?	3	3	-	1	n/a	4	3	4	3	2	20%	40%	10%	10%	10%	

A methodology for risk and capability assessment

In order to assess disaster management capabilities, a number of possible hazardous scenarios must be described and analyzed. No single methodology for scenario analyses has been presented or agreed upon in previous work of this nature in the Baltic Sea Region.

The Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) has worked on such scenario analyses for a number of years, an example of such work has been given in [7]. Now, MSB has assisted the Task C project group in presenting a new document, called “The BSR methodology for risk and capability assessments, a first approach”. This methodology, given in Appendix A, on a simplified version of a methodology for risk and capability assessments, has been used within the From Gaps to Caps project, where the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario was utilized as a case study. At Seminar no. 3, held in Hamburg in June 2016, the project group tested the methodology and applied it to the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario in a workshop during the meeting.

The methodologies for risk and capability assessments currently being used in the BSR, and in the UK and the Netherlands have been described and investigated in the project (see Chapter 2). After further investigations on possible methodologies, and after having performed the above mentioned workshop at the Hamburg meeting, the project group agreed to promote and use the methodology for risk and

capability assessments presented in Appendix A for further development.

In this chapter we will therefore present a very brief description of “The BSR methodology for risk and capability assessments, a first approach”. A more detailed description of the method is presented in Appendix A. The method in Appendix A was used by the participants in Task C of this project to analyze the “Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario” at the Hamburg meeting and a very brief description of that scenario and the workshop is and how is given.

A scenario analysis methodology for risk and capability assessment

The guidelines for scenario analysis are developed within the work with National Risk and Capability Assessment (NRCA) at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

The purpose of the national risk and capability assessment is to identify and analyze risks, vulnerabilities and capabilities to prevent and respond to crises. The National Risk and Capability Assessment (NRCA) forms a strategic basis for development of civil contingencies.

Many of the incidents analyzed in the NRCA are associated with significant uncertainty, both in terms of likelihood and

impact. A scenario analysis therefore plays a central role in assessing the ability to prevent and respond to crises. Scenario analysis can increase knowledge about what the needs are to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen capabilities to prevent and respond to different incidents.

The aim of the guidelines given in Appendix A is to contribute to the development of a solid (and holistic) uniform scenario analysis. The objective was to develop guidelines that are user-friendly, practical, and create conditions for scenario analysis of good quality. The guidelines are also intended to be used for analyses of scenarios in other contexts and by actors other than the state, regional or local authorities. Moreover, the guidelines are based on a method that can be used for an assessment of impact and capability more generally (for example, in the evaluation of actual events and exercises).

Figure 5.1 on page 49 gives an overview of the six elements of the guidelines. In essence, the elements should be performed in the order they are presented in the guidelines. Several elements are however overlapping, e.g. assessment of vulnerabilities and gaps in capability (Element 6) and identification of the overall capability to prevent and manage the event (Element 2); the description of the scenario (Element 3) and assessment of consequences (Element 5); or the assessment of vulnerabilities and gaps in capability (Element 6) and consequences (Element 5).




Figure 5.1
A summary of the contents of the six elements and related steps

The Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario as a case study

At the Gaps to Caps project meeting held in Hamburg in June 2016, a majority of the meeting time was dedicated to workshops in which the new BSR methodology, was applied to the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario from the 14.3 project. In this section we shall very briefly describe the Extreme weather/storm scenario, taken from *Red Book One* of the 14.3 project [12].

The background of the scenario assumes that the weather in Northern Europe has been clear and cold in late November and early December, with temperatures around -10°C at night and 5°C on average during the day. Electricity consumption has been high in this season. Weather forecasts indicate that there might be heavy squalls, snowfall or rain over large parts of the region, covering several bordering counties including both larger cities and the countryside.

On 6 December, a low pressure system starts developing south of Newfoundland. It strengthens rapidly and moves into the central North Atlantic. On 8 December it hits Scotland and Northern Ireland. On 9 December, at 03:00 local time, the storm hits Denmark. It then moves into the southern parts of Sweden and the Baltic Sea, and dissipates over Russia on 10 December.




Fig. 5.2
Extreme Weather/
Storm Scenario

When the storm hits Denmark it has wind speeds of 130 km/h, and wind gusts of 170 km/h, making it a category 1 hurricane. The storm retains most of its strength as it moves across the Baltic Sea, with St. Petersburg experiencing gusts of 130 km/h.

Because of strong winds and glaciations, power lines break down and distribution plants eventually short-circuit. This results in extensive power failure. The storm also causes extensive disruptions in electronic communications. Roads become more or less inaccessible due to the icy conditions combined with snowdrifts as well as fallen trees and power lines. There are reports of several road accidents. The public is advised to stay home. The storm has effects on several sectors of society, such as disruptions in the payment system, the provision of food and drinking water, the municipal healthcare service, etc.

The storm subsides after three days. Many people, houses and villages are cut off by snowdrifts up to two meters deep. The electricity grid's reduced capability and overloading results in power shortages in the affected areas, particularly in Denmark, Sweden, Estonia and Russia.

A full description of the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario (one of 6 scenarios developed within the 14.3 project) is given in *Red Book One* of the 14.3 project [12].

Test of the methodology

In order to assess and test the Swedish methodology a workshop with all project partners was conducted in Hamburg in June 2016. During the workshop the methodology was presented and it was tested using the scenario described above.


In preparation for the workshop the project partners were asked to analyze several questions in regard to the general event of extreme weather/storm. The questions focused on overall conditions currently in place to prevent and respond to this type of event. The answers were presented as a test of Element 2 in the methodology during the workshop. The questions were divided into the following four main categories:

- Experiences and level of knowledge
- Warning and alarm
- Responsibilities, roles, management and cooperation
- Communication

The workshop then consisted of three group exercises where the participants had to use the methodology to be able to assess the risk and capabilities according to the scenario. The first step after presenting the scenario the participants had to analyze the influence on vital societal functions and list the five most serious difficulties in responding to the scenario and the five most serious difficulties in maintaining vital societal functions.

Figure 5.3

When analysing the consequences the first step is to understand how the vital societal functions are affected by the scenario.



Conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

The results were used as a basis when assessing the consequences for the societal protection values in the BSR. In addition to consequences based on the influence on vital societal functions (difficulties in response and maintenance) the participants also analyzed the direct consequences for the other four protection values:

- Human life and health,
- Democracy rule of law and human rights,
- Economy and the environment and
- National sovereignty

As a result of the consequence assessment, the participants listed the top five most serious consequences due to the scenario.

The final group exercise during the workshop focused on assessing the capability by answering a question on which gaps in capability lead to the identified consequences. The participants analyzed why the most serious consequences due to the scenario did occur and whether it was because of gaps in prevention, response or the maintenance of vital societal functions. The gaps identified were categorized using the five capability dimensions:

- Management/Leadership
- Resources
- Knowledge
- Communication and
- Cooperation

The day after the workshop the methodology was evaluated by the participating partners. Three questions were asked on whether the methodology is clear, user friendly and if it contributes to solid scenario analyses. The project partners agreed that the answer to all three questions was yes and found that the Swedish approach to risk and capability assessments was suitable for adoption and further development as a harmonized methodology for the Baltic Sea Region.

The current project is aimed at building knowledge on disaster risk management capability assessments and developing a more common understanding of such assessments at national level in the Baltic Sea Region. The project is meant to contribute to the implementation of a macro-regional civil protection strategy and joint macro-regional prevention and preparedness approach towards major hazards and emergencies as set forth under the Policy Area Secure in the 2013 Action Plan. It builds on the results of the 14.3 project implemented during 2012–2013 [1].

The objectives of the Gaps to Caps project have been met in various different ways. All project partners have taken part in developing and answering several questionnaires, investigating the status and expectations regarding disaster risk management in the project partner countries. New knowledge has been gathered and presented to project partners. Several project meetings have been held to inform of this

and perform hands-on exercises using a new methodology for risk and capability assessment.

In this final chapter, we shall give a discussion on the lessons learned and list the main conclusions.

Discussion

The project group has found that there is great variety in how the project partner countries handle disaster management, as it was described in Chapter 2 of this report. Some of the countries have no specific methodology in place and rely to some extent on past experiences. Other partner countries have been considering such methodologies or have them under development.

The purpose of risk and capability assessments is to identify and analyze risks, vulnerabilities and capabilities in order to prevent and respond to crises. No single methodology for such assessments had previously been presented or agreed upon within the Baltic Sea Region. This conclusion is clear when reviewing Chapter 2 of this report, describing in summary some of the more advanced methodologies that have been proposed, such as methodologies presented by the UK, the Netherlands and by Sweden. This is also evident when reviewing the results of the questionnaire discussed in Chapter 3 and presented in Appendix C.

In this context, the project group for Task C concluded that it would be of great benefit for the Baltic Sea Region countries if a harmonized methodology for risk and capability assessments could be formulated and developed within the region. The methodology would have to be practical and flexible, should be applicable at all levels of government and to all actors in the field and should allow scenario analysis as well as taking the experience from exercises and emergencies into account.

In Chapter 2, the capability assessment methodologies used in the UK and the Netherlands were described. When analysing the differences and similarities with the new proposed methodology for the Baltic Sea Region as described in Appendix A, the Gaps to Caps project group found that the advantages of the new method were significant. In Appendix B, when looking at possible future opportunities and challenges regarding such methodologies, it is stated that the new proposal (as described in Appendix A), is user-friendly, practical and creates conditions for scenario analysis of a good quality. Moreover, there is a strong linkage between hypothetical scenarios, actual events and exercises. The new methodology thus allows a strong link between Task C and Task D, which plays an important role in capability assessment process.

The work within this project has led to considerable advances for the Baltic Sea Region with respect to cooperation and further development of disaster management methodologies. Mainly two methodologies for considering capability assessments have been investigated and worked on.

The first methodology investigated is the so called EU questionnaire as presented in reference [3]. Chapter 5 of this report presents a questionnaire on this methodology and discusses results from all 10 project countries in this regard. The results show that the EU questionnaire [3] can be a very valuable tool when estimating to what extent a given country is prepared to assess capability. The methodology can also be used as a first step in a more comprehensive capability assessment. The weakness of the EU questionnaire is perhaps that the results achieved when using the method are very reliant on the person or persons answering the questions. Therefore, care must be taken when assigning personnel to the task.

A second methodology has been presented and has been used in a hands-on exercise by the project partners on a given scenario (Extreme Weather/Storm) at a meeting in Hamburg in June 2016. Thus, a methodology for risk and capability assessments has been presented and tested by the project group. There is a general agreement amongst the project partners that this methodology can serve as a

bases for a methodology for the BSR, to be improved upon and developed within the region. A simple description of this methodology is given in Appendix A.

The project group has found that available sources of knowledge on risk management capability may be roughly divided into three intersecting categories: i.e. scenario analyses, evaluations of exercises and studies of real-life experiences. These issues have been the main subjects of the considerable work carried out in Tasks C and D of the current project. The project group has found that the new proposed risk and capability assessment methodology, presented in Appendix A, is very well suited to combine work on these issues, i.e. scenario analysis, evaluation of exercises and studies of real-life experiences.

Main conclusions

In summary, the main findings and contributions of the From Gaps to Caps project are the following:

- ① The existing capability assessment approaches in the EU/BSR (5 Nordic countries, 3 Baltic countries, Poland, Germany, UK and the Netherlands) have been investigated, discussed and reported on within the current project, resulting in a number of lessons learned by the project partners.
- ② A number of questionnaires were formulated and answered by the project partners where issues of capability assessments were further investigated. The results are documented in Appendix C (the state of risk and capability assessments in the BSR) and Appendix D (Evaluation of the EU guidelines). In this light, cross-border issues could be discussed and opportunities for improvements investigated and documented (see Chapters 3 and 4).
- ③ Through several seminars and workshops the project group found that the Swedish approach to risk and capability assessments was most suitable for adoption and further development as a harmonized methodology for the Baltic Sea Region.
- ④ Based on this, a methodology for scenario analysis, risk and capability assessment was documented and described (see Chapter 5 and Appendix A). The method was tested, using the Extreme Weather/Storm Scenario from the 14.3 project in a series of workshops held at a project meeting in Hamburg in June 2016. All project partners agree that this method should be introduced and developed further within the BSR.
- ⑤ Having agreed on a common basis for a capability assessment methodology, some work was carried out on possible future developments, opportunities and challenges for risk and capability assessments in the Baltic Sea Region (see Appendix B).
- ⑥ The results presented in this project will provide a solid base for future work aimed at harmonizing risk and capability assessment work within the Baltic Sea Region. A major achievement is the acceptance and promotion of a new proposed methodology for risk and capability assessments in the BSR, which is fully in line with the objective of “strengthening capacity to respond and to recover from major emergencies and accidents: better risk assessment and crisis management“ of the Policy Area Secure within the EUSBSR. All project partners agree that this methodology should be introduced within the partner countries and should serve as a basis for further development work in the field.

The project group would like to recommend that further research and development work be carried out along the above lines in the near future.

Capability assessments are used in disaster risk management to facilitate decision making regarding capability increasing measures. The aim of Task C in the current project was to build knowledge in this area and developing a more common understanding of such assessments at national level in the Baltic Sea Region. The project partners believe that this main aim has been achieved by the execution of this project.

Appendix A - refers to "The BSR methodology for risk and capability assessments, a first approach"

Appendix B - refers to the paper "Possible future opportunities for risk and capability assessments in the BSR"

Appendix C refers to the document "Answers to questionnaire 1 from participating partners"

This appendix is 40 pages long and is, for convenience, not provided in this version of the report on Task C. The full version of the appendix is available from the Gaps to Caps Project Coordinator: The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania: international@vpgt.lt.

In order to get an overview of the status of both national risk assessment plans and the status of capability assessments in each of the participating countries, a questionnaire was carried out. Each country was asked to answer the 10 following questions:

- ① Is your country working on a capability assessment? If yes, is it linked to the work with the national risk assessment?
- ② Will your country be using the EU guidelines questionnaire to do the capability assessment?

- ③ Do you have a method for capability assessment (developed in your own country)? If yes, can you share any documentation on this method? (links, copies etc.)
- ④ Can you please list the scenarios covered in your National Risk Assessment (Name and theme)
- ⑤ If the work in Task C of Gaps to Caps decides to focus on a specific scenario to begin with, while developing the capability assessment methodology; Which one or two of the six scenarios identified in 14.3 would you recommend starting with?
- ⑥ Will your capability assessment focus on: National capabilities? Cross-border/Macro-regional capabilities? Both?
- ⑦ Do you have a national register of capabilities (database or similar)? On national, regional or local level?
- ⑧ Do you have a definition of critical societal functions in your country? (What should be up and running in any situation)
- ⑨ Do you have a set of criteria for these critical societal functions (For example – how long can you accept being without electricity etc.?)
- ⑩ Is “acceptable risk” in any way defined in your country? (If yes, please specify how)

Some of the above were “yes” or “no” questions but others required considerable text input.

The full results are available from the Gaps to Caps Coordinator, as detailed above.

Appendix D refers to the document "Evaluation of EU Guideline questions"

This appendix is 60 pages long and is, for convenience, not provided in this version of the report on Task C. The full version of the appendix is available from the Gaps to Caps Project Coordinator: The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania: international@vpgt.lt.

The EU document „Risk Management Capability Assessment Guidelines” (2015/C 261/03)” [3] contains 51 questions that are meant to serve as a way of collecting information that can be useful as input when assessing management capability to meet disasters.

The EU guideline methodology was introduced to the project partners at Seminar no. 1, held in Riga, May 2015. To test the methodology, a questionnaire was circulated amongst the partners, asking them to answer the 51 questions and give comments on questions of choice. The results are described in the full version of Appendix D, available from the Gaps to Caps project Coordinator, as detailed above.

References

- 1 EUSBSR 14.3 project on Macro-Regional Risk Scenarios and Gaps Identification, www.14point3.eu
- 2 EU Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management (SEC [2010] 1626 final)
- 3 Risk Management Capability Assessment Guidelines (2015/C 261/03).
- 4 ISO-guidelines for emergency management capability assessment (ISO/CD 22 325)
- 5 PowerPoint document presented by Gavin Lofthous UK Cabinet Office (2015)
- 6 PowerPoint document presented, Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Netherlands (2015)
- 7 Risker och förmagor 2013 (Risks and capabilities 2013). MSB, Sweden.
- 8 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/civil_protection/vademecum/de/2-de-1.html#over
- 9 Bericht zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz 2013, Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 18/208
- 10 „Methode zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz“ Wissenschaftsforum Band 8 des BBK, www.bbk.bund.de
- 11 National Risk and Capability Assessment. Myndigheten för samhällssäkerhet och beredskap, MSB, Stockholm, 2016.
- 12 Red Book One of the 14.3 project on Macro-Regional Risk Scenarios and Gaps Identification, <http://www.14point3.eu/>

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